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Undetachable Signatures from Pairings 
 
Yang Shi, Xiaoping Wang, Liming Cao, Jianxin Ren 




It is expect that mobile agents technology will bring significant benefits to electronic commerce. But security issues, 
especially threats from malicious hosts, become a great obstacle of widespread deployment of applications in electronic 
commerce based on mobile agents technology. Undetachable digital signature is a category of digital signatures to 
secure mobile agents against malicious hosts. An undetachable signature scheme by using encrypted functions from 
bilinear pairings was proposed in this paper. The security of this scheme base on the computational intractability of 
discrete logarithm problem and computational Diffe-Hellman problem on gap Diffle-Hellman group. Furthermore, the 
scheme satisfies all the requirements of a strong non-designated proxy signature i.e. verifiability, strong unforgeability, 
strong identifiability, strong undeniability and preventions of misuse. An undetachable threshold signature scheme that 
enable the customer to provide n mobile agents with ‘shares’ of the undetachable signature function is also provided. It 
is able to provide more reliability than classical undetachable signatures. 
 




Mobile agents technology are attracting a great deal of 
interest from both industry and academia since middle 
of 1990’s. Compared with traditional computing models, 
e.g. client/server, mobile agents technology has 
following advantages[1][2][3]:. 
 Autonomous mobile agents strive to achieve a 
given goal without permanent observation by 
its owner. As a matter of consequence, the 
user is free to take care of other tasks, saving 
time in the process. 
 If a host is being shut down, all mobile agents 
executing on that machine are warned and 
given time to dispatch and continue their 
operation on another host in the network. 
 Users may dispatch mobile agents over a 
temporary network connection to a target 
network. After dispatching, the temporary 
network link may be brought down until a 
later point in time. 
 
Mobile agents technique brings significant benefits to 
electronic commerce because of these advantages. But 
on the other hand, there are also some problems. The 
most important one is security. 
 
Threats to the security of mobile agents generally fall 
into four comprehensive classes[4]:  
 Agent against agent platform 
 Agent platform against agent 
 Agent against other agents 
 Other entities against agent system 
 
Hohl[5] identified the following attacks: spying out 
code; spying out data; spying out control flow; 
manipulation of code; manipulation of data; 
manipulation of control flow;. incorrect execution of 
code; masquerading of the host; denial of execution; 
spying out interaction with other agents; manipulation 
of interaction with other agents; returning wrong results 
of system calls issued by the agent. 
 
Thus, security issues, especially threatens from 
potentially malicious hosts become a great obstacle of 
widespread deployment of applications in electronic 
commerce based on mobile agents technique. 
 
2. PREVIOUS WORKS ABOUT UNDETACHABLE 
DIGITAL SIGNATURES 
 
2.1 The preliminary idea 
 
Before 1998, many researchers believed that, on 
malicious hosts, mobile agents were impossible to 
prevent tampering unless trusted and tamper-resistant 
hardware is available. Follow points[6] are considered 
by them: 
 Cleartext data can be read and changed. 
 Cleartext programs can be manipulated. 
 Cleartext messages can be faked. 
 
But Sander and Tschudin[7] pointed out that this belief 
is incorrect because mobile agents do not have to be 
executed in cleartext form. They proposed the idea of 
undetachable digital signatures that allows a mobile 
agent to effectively produce a digital signature inside a 
remote and possibly malicious host without the host 
being able to deduce the agent’s secret or to reuse the 
signature routine for arbitrary documents. Here is a brief 
introduction of the idea. 
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Let Sig  be a rational function used by C  (a 
customer) to produce the digital signature )(mSig  of 
an arbitrary message m . Furthermore suppose the 
message m  is the result of a rational function f 
applied to some input data x . Finally the verification 
function Ver  that C  publishes in order to let others 
check the validity of the digital signature z  is 
regarded to be a valid signature of m  if and only if: 
)(mSigz =               (1) 
For letting the customer’s mobile agent create 
“undetachable” signatures, he computes: 
fSigf Signed o=             (2) 
Then he sends Signedf  and f to S (a shop) with his 
mobile agent. S evaluates: 
)(xfm =                    (3) 
        )(xfz Signed=              (4) 
Though the signature function, Sig , is not known by 
others, every one can verify the validity of a message 
m  by testing: 
mzVer
?
)( =               (5) 
 
2.2  The first implementation 
 
Although Sander and Tschudin tried to give a outline of 
undetachable digital signatures by using birational 
functions based on Shamir’s work[8]. Unfortunately no 
secure undetachable digital signatures scheme has been 
proposed until 2000. In 2000 Kotzanikolaou, Burmester 
and Chrissikopoulos presented an RSA 
implementation[9] of undetachable digital signatures. 
But this scheme does not provide server’s 
non-repudiation because it does not contain server’s 
signature[10]. 
 
2.3 Strong proxy signatures and other 
implementations 
 
In 2001 Lee, Kim and Kim provided an RSA based 
construction of undetachable digital signatures called 
"Strong Non-designated Proxy Signature" [10]. Their 
scheme enhanced [9] and often be acronymized as 
"LKK-SPS" scheme. A scheme of undetachable 
threshold signature[13] was proposed by Borselius, 
Mitchell and Wilson in the same year. In 2002, a strong 
proxy signature scheme with proxy signer privacy 
protection[11] was given and a pragmatic alternative to 
undetachable signatures[12] was also proposed. 
 
3. BILINEAR PAIRINGS AND SIGNATURE 
SCHEMES BASED ON THEM 
 
3.1 Mathematical preliminaries of Bilinear Pairings 
 
Let 1G  be a cyclic group generated by P , whose 
order is a prime q , and 2G be a cyclic multiplicative 
group of the same order q : The discrete logarithm 
problems in both 1G  and 2G  are hard. Let 
211: GGGe →×  be a pairing satisfies the following 
conditions: 
 Bilinear:  (6) and (7) or (8) 
,Q),Q)e(P e(P,Q) Pe(P 2121 =+       (6) 
))e(P,Q e(P,Q Qe(P,Q ) 2121 =+        (7) 
ab e(P,Q)e(aP, bQ) =             (8) 
 Non-degenerate: There exists 1GP∈  and 
1GQ∈  subject to (9). 
1≠ e(P,Q)                 (9) 
 Computability: There is an efficient algorithm 
to compute  e(P,Q)  for all 1},{ GQP ⊆  
 
We note that the Weil and Tate pairings associated with 
supersingular elliptic curves or abelian varieties can be 
modified to create such bilinear maps. Suppose that G is 
an additive group. Four mathematical problems is 
defined as follow [14][15]. 
 Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP):  
Given two group elements P  and Q , 
and an integer n , such that (10) is satisfied 
whenever such an integer exists. 
nPQ =                (10) 
 Decision Diffle-Hellman Problem (DDHP): 
For *},,{ qZcba ⊆ , given  cPP, aP, bP,  
decide whether: 
)(mod qabc ≡         (11) 
 Computational Diffe-Hellman Problem 
(CDHP): 
For *},{ qZba ⊆  P, aP, bP  
compute abP  
 Gap Diffle-Hellman Problem (GDHP):  
A class of problems where DDHP is 
easy while CDHP is hard. 
 
We assume through this paper that CDHP and DLP are 
intractable, which means there is no polynomial time 
algorithm to solve CDHP or DLP with non-negligible 
probability. When the DDHP is easy but the CDHP is 
hard on the group 1G , 1G  is called a Gap 
Diffle-Hellman (GDH) group. Such groups can be 
found on supersingular elliptic curves or hyperelliptic 
curves over finite fields, and the bilinear parings can be 
derived from the Weil or Tate pairing 
211: GGGe →× . Our schemes of this paper can be 
built on any GDH group. More mathematical 
background can be found in [14][16][17][18]. Now, 
some system parameters should be defined for Sec. 4 as 
following: Let P  be a generator of 1G , the bilinear 
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paring is 211: GGGe →× . Moreover, to hash 
functions are given here: qZH →
*
1 }1,0{:  and 
1
*
2 }1,0{: GH → . The implementation of these hash 
functions can be referred to works such as [25]. But the 
choice of conventional hash functions should be very 
carefully because many hash functions were cracked 
recently [26]. 
 
3.2 A Survey of Signature Schemes Based on Bilinear 
Pairings 
 
In recent years, variety schemes of digital signatures 
have been proposed. For threshold signatures, 
Boldyreva[15] proposed a robust proactive threshold 
signature scheme, a multi-signature scheme and a blind 
signature scheme which work in any Gap Diffie 
Hellman group in 2002. Then Vo, Zhang and Kim[19] 
presented a new threshold blind digital signature based 
on pairings without the third party. For Mutilsignatures, 
Lin, Wu and Zhang[20] proposed a new structured 
multi-signature scheme from the Gap Diffie-Hellman 
Group that considers the signing order among 
co-signers. Boneh, Boyen and Shacham[21] constructed 
a short group signature scheme based on the Strong 
Diffie-Hellman assumption. Nguyen[22] proposed a 
group signature scheme with constant-size parameters 
that does not require any trapdoor secret, thereby, allows 
sharing of public parameters among organizations. As to 
Blind signature, Chow et al.[23] gave an unlinkable 
partially blind signature scheme and an ID-based 
unlinkable partially blind signature scheme. 
Furthermore, Zhang et al.[24] addressed that it was easy 
to design proxy signature and proxy blind signature 
from the conventional ID-based signature schemes 
using bilinear pairings and gave some concrete schemes 
based on existed ID-based signature schemes. 
 





Assume that all participants have the common system 
parameters: ( )2121 ,,,,,, HHPqeGG . 
Settings about the customer： 
 Let C  be an identifier for the Customer. 
 Let Cs  be the signature key of C . 
 Let CPU  be the verification key of C  
where: 
PsPU CC =                    (12) 
 Let Creq _  be the constraints of the 
Customer. 
 Let CT  be the timestamp of Creq _ . 
Settings about shops：  
 Let S  be an identifier for a shop. 
 Let Ss  be the signature key of S . 
 Let SPU  be the verification key of S  
where: 
PsPU SS =       (13) 
 Let Sbid _  be the bid information of S . 
 Let ST  be the timestamp of Sbid _ . 
 Let *1 }1,0{: →Gϕ  be a function 
mapping a point of 1G  into a binary string. 
 
4.2 Security scheme 
 
The Customer does following operations： 
 Computes: 
)||_||(2 CC TCreqCHH =       (14) 
 Computes: 
CCC HsK ⋅=                (15) 
 Gives )||_||( CTCreqC  to the Agent. 
 Gives to the Agent as part of its executable 
code the undetachable signature function pair: 
CHf )()( ⋅=⋅              (16) 
  and 
CSigned Kf )()( ⋅=⋅              (17) 
Suppose： 
)()( ⋅= CsxSig               (18) 
It turns out the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. The functions above construct an 




























          (19) 
After the Agent migrated to the host of S ，the validity 
of the mobile agent should be verified first by checking: 
( ) ( )CCC PUHePKe ,,
?
=       (20) 
If it is a valid signature of C , then S  does following 
operations： 
 Computes: 
( )SCS TSbidSTCreqCHH ||_||||||_||2=
(21) 
 Computes: 
SS HsY =                (22) 




( ))(1 YHx ϕ=       (23) 
 Computes: 
)(xfz Signed=       (24) 
 Gives ),_,,,,,( SS TSbidSHYzx  to the 
mobile agent. 
 
After the mobile agent goes back to C . The 
correctness of (21) and (23) should be verified first. 
Then the verification should be performed by formula 
(25): 
( ) ( )SS PUHePYe ,,
?
=         (25) 
 
4.3 Security Analysis 
 
The following proposition can be obtained because 1G  
is a GDH group. 
 
Proposition 2.  A transaction is valid if and only if 
(20), (21), (23) and (25) are true. 
Proof.  If the mobile Agent is not detached before it 



























             (26) 
 
If an opponent Oscar want to modify C ’s bid 
information when C ’s agent mobiles to his host, he 
has to construct a new undetachable digital signature 
pair ( )CC KH ,  of the Customer which will include 
modified constraints '_ Creq  of the Customer. But 
this needs to solve the computational difficult problems 
mentions in section 3.1. 
 
Furthermore, if a transaction is valid: 

























                  (27) 
Similar to equation (20), the security of (23) and (25) 
also relies upon the difficulty of the problems 
computational infeasible to solve at present. 
 
5. UNDETACHABLE THRESHOLD SIGNATURES 
 
5.1 Basic Idea 
The notion of undetachable threshold signatures was 
introduced in [27]. An undetachable threshold signature 
scheme will enable the customer, C , to provide n 
mobile agents with ‘shares’ of the signature key (where 
the shares will be a function of Creq _  and CT ). 
For more details about undetachable threshold signature 
such as their usage and application can be found in [27]. 
 
5.2 Security Scheme 
 
Based on undetachable signature scheme proposed in 
section 4, a variety of secret sharing scheme can be used 
to construct undetachable threshold signatures by 
converting Cs  into signature shares. An example using 
Lagrange Polynomial Interpolation is given here: 
Suppose f  is a polynomial over qZ  with degree 
1−t  subject to (28). 
)0(fsC =                  (28) 
Operations in equations (29) to (32) and (38) are 
performed over qZ . 
Let:  
niifsi L,2,1),( ==          (29) 
Then any one has t shares can obtain Cs  by 









































1            (30) 
To simplify the description we suppose the t shares are 



























1             (32) 
Then C  does following extra operations  
 Computes: 
niPsPC ii ,,1, L==    (33) 











      (34) 
 Computes: 
niHsK Cii ,,1, L=⋅=    (35)  
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 Gives nPCPC ||||1 L  to these n agents. 
Finally, C  gives (36) to the i-th agent as part of its 
executable code instead of (17): 
iiSigned Kf )()(, ⋅=⋅            (36) 
After the i-th Agent migrated to the host of S ，the 
validity of the mobile agent should be verified first the 
by checking: 
( ) ( )iii PCHePKe ,,
?
=          (37) 
It is clear that a shop has t or more than t shares can 
reconstruct Signedf  by (38). But anyone cannot 








, )()(         (38) 
After a shop has reconstruct Signedf  successfully, other 
operations are similar to undetachable signatures 
proposed in section 4. So redundant words are omitted. 
 
 6. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we have presented a novel implementation 
of undetachable digital signatures and a correspondent 
security scheme. Compared to [9][10], our scheme uses 
a different cryptosystem to construct undetachable 
signatures. This implementation of undetachable digital 
signatures is based on non-interactive CEF (Computing 
with Encrypted Functions) from bilinear pairings to 
protect the original signature function Sig  by 
encrypting it with a function f  to obtain the 
encrypted function Signedf  defined as the composition 
of Sig  and f . Furthermore, the scheme satisfies all 
the five requirements of a strong non-designated proxy 
signature proposed by Lee et al. in [10] as follow: First, 
verifiability: A proxy signer can create a valid proxy 
signature for the original signer. But the original signer 
and any third party cannot create a valid proxy signature 
with the name of proxy signer, Second, strong 
unforgeability: Anyone can determine the identity of the 
corresponding proxy signer form a proxy signature. 
Third, strong identifiability: Once a proxy signer creates 
a valid proxy signature on behalf of an original signer, 
the proxy signer cannot repudiate his signature creation 
against anyone. Fourth, strong undeniability: It should 
be confident that proxy key pair cannot be used for 
other purpose. In the case of misuse, the responsibility 
of proxy signer should be determined explicitly. Finally, 
preventions of misuse: From a proxy signature a verifier 
can be convinced of the original signer's agreement on 
the signed message.  
 
As to the undetachable threshold signature scheme 
proposed in the paper, it has following features: First, 
each agent can use their share to sign a message M , 
e.g. a piece of bid information, of their choice to obtain 
a ‘signature share’. Second, The ‘correctness’ of a 
signature share can be verified independently of any 
other signature shares. Third, any shop, when equipped 
with t  different signature shares restricted with the 
same request of C  for the same message M , can 
construct a signature on M  which will be verifiable 
by any party with a trusted copy of public key of C , 
and which will also enable the corresponding Creq _  
and CT  to be verified. Finally, knowledge of less than 
t  different signature shares for the same message 
M cannot be used to construct a valid signature one the 
message M , knowledge of any number of different 
signature shares for messages other than the message 
M  will not enable the construction of a valid signature 
on M  and knowledge of any number of different 
signature shares for request other than Creq _  or 
with a different time stamp will not enable the 
construction of a valid signature with associated 
Creq _  and CT . So our scheme satisfied all the 
requirements of undetachable threshold signatures 
defined in [27] and provide more reliability than 
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